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UNCAPTURING LAW SCHOOL REGULATION
SAUL LEVMORE*

I agree with most of what the previous speaker has said, and I
doubt that I would have said it as well. I will instead talk a bit
about the regulatory environment in which we find ourselves, as
well as the prospect of change. It is one thing to feel outrage,
and quite another to imagine the world as different from the
way it is at present. Regulatory capture may be nearly inevitable.
It is unsurprising that most people affected by law, here and
elsewhere, are uncomfortable with the idea of anybody simply
self-identifying as a lawyer, engineer, doctor, or nurse, without
formal training and licensing. We can imagine a competitive
world, with many well-informed consumers and no expectation
of licensing, in which people develop brand names in order to
convey information. But that world, with ease of entry and
reputation as a controlling mechanism, seems surreal. The
question is, then, how do we regulate in the world we know?
One possibility is to measure output. State, national, or private
exams could be used, much as they are used for drivers' licenses.
But once we move to air conditioning engineers and beyond,
political activity is everywhere.
Think, for instance, of The University of Chicago and its great
students. Much as I resist sounding like Stanley Kaplan, of test
preparation fame, I do not think any state bar can come up with
an exam that our students could not pass at a 98 or 99 percent
rate, so long as the intention is for well-equipped graduates of
local law schools to pass as well. The students at elite law schools
have a great many skills, and one of those skills is being very,
very good at taking exams. It is, after all, part of what was needed
to gain entry to such schools in the first place. We might think
that some elite law schools could do a much better job training
lawyers and educating students. But it is unlikely or even
* Saul Levmore is Dean and William B. Graham Professor at the University of
Chicago Law School. He was President of the American Law Deans Association from
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impossible for a bar exam to have much affect on the legal
education at these elite schools, because any exam that works for
the mass of applicants will be easily passed by those masters of
exam taking. In developing an exam that works for a broader
population of bar applicants, the testmakers lose their ability (at
least through an output test) to have much influence on what
Yale Law School or another elite law school does. If they wish to
control legal education, they must therefore regulate the elite
law school's inputs.
As a result, regulators, if empowered, will naturally seek to
affect (even) the elite law schools through direct regulation of
their inputs. There will develop rules about what ought to be
taught and for how many hours, and so forth. I call this
"natural" because when well-meaning people get together to
certify members of a profession, it is inevitable that they will try
to improve the profession in the process. Each regulator has a
view of what the profession requires, and those views will be
reflected in instructions to the law schools and applicants.
Of course, potential regulators could choose not to regulate.
They might decide to rely on the ABA or some national quasiaccrediting agency to certify law school graduates as fit to
practice. Some who sit for the bar will have been self-educated.
But I think this is politically unrealistic.
In the real world, people affiliated with the ABA and other
organizations, either professionally or in a volunteer capacity,
start thinking, "What would make a law school reputable and
trustworthy?" We do not want just anyone, or especially someone
who is "trained" outside of established schools to call himself a
lawyer or an engineer. This is where the ABA and the Section on
Legal Education are at present. They start out by saying that
everyone should not be able to call themselves a lawyer, and
before long they find themselves at meetings with other wellintentioned people, saying "I guess it was too much to require
7.3 linear feet of space for each ten students in the library. Oh,
we'll cut back on that a little bit and then we'll add this and
that."1 There is constant regulation and re-regulation. The
1. For the current library facility regulations, which are now more general than the

specific requirements in the past, see AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 2006-2007 STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE at Standard
702
(2006),
available
at
2007StandardsBookMaster.PDF.

http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/2006-
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regulators begin to think how they might have been better
educated, or how they might ensure that lawyers are trustworthy
and reputable. They begin by agreeing that not everyone ought
to be able to self-identify as a lawyer, and they move to a scene in
which there is an ABA and a Section on Legal Education with
frequent meetings and proposals and requests from interest
groups. They come to require blackboards of certain sizes,
faculty with certain length contracts, and much more. Each step
seems reasonable, or at least responsive to some particular
concern, and each is a testament to process. But the overall
product is a regulatory code that is long, subjective, open to
constant lobbying, and capable of disparate and strategic
interpretation. In turn, the regulated entities, which are the law
schools for the most part, must prepare mountains of
paperwork-in anticipation of and then in response to each site
visit. It is an enormous regulatory apparatus, all done,
presumably, in order to seem evenhanded in saying to a few
start-up schools, "You know, you look a little too much like some
guy in his living room trying to turn out lawyers left and right." I
do not know that we will find an easy solution to this problem,
but you have to understand that what I describe is reality, and a
perfectly predictable though unpleasant picture.
I am [at the time of this conference] the President of the
American Law Deans Association, which might also sound like
an interest group. But when we are having a meeting and there
are 150 people in the room going on about sending letters to
the Department of Education and the Department of Justice to
complain about regulations, no dean stands up to say, "No, stop
complaining about the regulatory requirements because I love
the present system." But a few come close. Some might say "I like
the present system. It has been good for me as a dean of five law
schools over my career. Sometimes it has helped me convince
my university's president to authorize funds for construction;
sometimes it has helped by barring an incompetent new law
school from starting up down the road from me, after all the
hard work we put in." These, of course, are the words of anticompetitiveness. They are the complaints of someone who has
leaped over the regulatory barrier and resents the idea or
unfairness that the next institution in line might face a lower
barrier. One you have a library of the "right" size, diversity of the
right kind and degree, a legal writing program that meets
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someone else's (normally extant, very senior legal writing
instructors themselves) idea of minimum standards, and an
"appropriate" clinical program, you do not want that new fellow
opening up a law school that could compete without having to
meet all of these requirements. Suddenly, those who were
burdened by input regulation in the past become the biggest
fans of regulation. The deans of secure, major law schools with a
95 percent bar passage rate have no interest in this regulatory
apparatus. This should warn us that the regulatory system is anticompetitive.
As described thus far, it would be unsurprising if university
provosts and presidents reported that the accreditation of law
schools was no different from that of schools established to
certify engineers, doctors, and architects. But by all accounts the
comparison suggests that we lawyers win the prize for
overregulation. Presidents of universities do not hear from their
engineering, nursing, or medical school deans that they must
hire faculty in a certain way or find their accreditation
threatened. The market seems to work well for those
professions, and perhaps the influence of insurers plays some
role. If one wants to take an exam to be a pediatrician, that
exam-the output measure-seems to be effective. It is only law
schools
that are constantly burdening their central
administrations with regulations. This fact suggests a
bureaucracy out of control, instituted by well-meaning people
but bogged down by interest groups that have brought about a
large number of the regulations and standards currently in
place.
I suggest that skeptics attend a meeting of the Section on
Legal Education. The room will be circled with representatives
of interest groups, all insisting that they know what is good for
the profession and the country. Somehow the good is always to
have more regulation and legislation. Good luck in the attempt
at deregulation.
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